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Abstract
We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings 
and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a 
task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a com-
petitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme partici-
pants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their perfor-
mance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before 
the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition 
per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how 
much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. 
The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the com-
petitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.
Keywords Incomplete contracts · Asymmetric information · Competition · 
Cooperation · Public goods · Experiments
JEL Classification C91 · D80 · H41
1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is a central topic of the economics literature (Hillier 
1997) and is strictly related to the theory of incomplete contracts (Grossman and 
Hart 1986). Full information and contractual completeness is indeed one of the 
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fundamental hypotheses on which the theory of perfect competition rests: indeed full 
and perfect information is assumed during all the performance of a contract, since 
when it is signed until all the obligations are completed. Competitive markets with 
incomplete contracts are therefore imperfect, and, indeed, economic theory consid-
ers asymmetric information within the category of the failures of perfectly competi-
tive markets. Such an incompleteness stands for the absence of some pieces of infor-
mation about what would happen if some circumstances, which are not explicitly 
mentioned in the contract, occurred. In this context, Spier (1992) shows that asym-
metric information on the quality of the parties of a contract may also lead to con-
tractual incompleteness, which, however, signalling may solve. Indeed, in presence 
of performance incentives, agents are induced to signal their ability through effort. 
Such an issue is of particular importance also in the labour market, where negotia-
tions between employers and employees are affected by asymmetric information and 
therefore lead to incomplete contracts, although reciprocity may arise in presence of 
contract incompleteness and may serve to mitigate it and its effects (Fehr et al. 1997; 
Gächter and Fehr 2002). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) cite the absence of explicit 
performance incentives as a form of contract incompleteness that may lead to labour 
market inefficiencies, i.e. to the inability of principals to identify their agents’ types, 
because of the lack of incentives. Gächter and Fehr (2002) claim also that reciproc-
ity between agents and principals is likely to stem from contractual completeness: 
employees may return the employer’s generosity by increasing their effort.
Rousseau and Greller (1994) highlight that, even when contracts are complete, 
each party must trust the counterpart to respect the contract and act consequently. 
Asymmetric information plays a role here: if the occurrence of some circumstance 
is invisible (or opaque) to one of the contractual parties, then it will be unable to 
understand whether the contract is honoured or not. In this sense, a complete con-
tract, whose performance is affected by informative opaqueness might result in inef-
ficient outcomes (Li and He 2013), as an incomplete contract would. In other words, 
in presence of private information, the subject who acts under the veil of ignorance 
may suspect that her counterpart is not applying the contractual clauses fairly, as she 
cannot check it.
The possible effect that transparency, meant as disclosure of information about 
the implementation of contractual clauses in a competitive setting, may have on 
social interactions is the basis of this paper. In the light of the extant experimen-
tal literature, we first hypothesise that competition may result in less cooperation, 
but transparency (about some aspects of interaction) may mitigate such a negative 
effect. Indeed, as mentioned above, we are studying a main feature of competitive 
markets, and therefore, in order to disentangle the effect of transparent information 
and that of competition, we need to inquire the existence of a competition effect. 
Our hypothesis of a possible causal link between competition—as one character-
istic aspect of market interaction—and the propensity to cooperate is based on two 
considerations. On the one hand, we believe that the hypothesis of selfishness as the 
sole determinant of human behaviour is a reductive way of extending the behaviour 
in competitive markets to all aspects of economic interaction (for a similar point of 
view see for instance Fehr and Schmidt 2001). On the other, we share the view that 
economic institutions like markets not only have the function to allocate goods and 
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services, but also influence the evolution of individual preferences, i.e., the whole 
set of ‘values, tastes and personalities’ that constitute the ‘cultural trait’ of an indi-
vidual, so that social preferences and tastes depend on the institutional environment 
(Bowles 1998, 2011). In particular, we concentrate on one aspect of market interac-
tion, competition, and its effect on cooperative behaviour in the form of the propen-
sity to contribute in a public goods game. The issue of the relation between markets 
and values has been discussed broadly in the literature, and prosocial behaviour has 
been analysed empirically in many cross-cultural studies.1 However, to our knowl-
edge few contributions have used experiments in a controlled environment to study 
the relation between market interaction, information and pro-social behaviour.2 Our 
study wants to fill this gap in the experimental literature, by studying how exposure 
to a competitive environment has any effect on the individual disposition to contrib-
ute voluntarily to the provision of a public good.
The second aspect relates to the role of transparency. In addition to what already 
highlighted at the beginning of the section, Arnott et al. (1994) show the important 
role of information in fostering economic efficiency, where the latter increases as 
the former does. A way to ensure that relevant information reaches all the market 
agents is to enforce rules that promote transparency, i.e. the disclosure of potentially 
relevant information. An example of such a policy is the regulation of advanced 
financial markets (Vishwanath and Kaufmann 2001), where transparency decreases 
trading costs and increases liquidity of exchanged securities (Kim et  al. 2014; 
Boone and White 2015). The link between transparency and efficiency has also been 
inquired experimentally, for example in terms of welfare, where it has been seen that 
as information disclosure increases, so does the level of social welfare (Rietz et al. 
2013). However, the link between transparency and behaviour in a competitive set-
ting has not yet been explored.
The existing literature shows that experiments are a valuable way to inquire the 
relationships existing between norms and economic outcomes (Galbiati and Vertova 
2014; Holt and Sullivan 2017; Deffains et al. 2019). Therefore, this paper proposes 
an experiment that aims at inquiring into the following effects of competition and 
transparency on cooperation, as it emerges in a public goods game. First, we ask 
whether competition has any effect on the willingness to give any positive amount 
to the voluntary provision of a public good. Second, whether the knowledge of the 
results of the competition in terms of ranking and remuneration (which is the way 
transparency is implemented in this paper) affects one’s contribution to the public 
good. As will be discussed later in detail, we disclose this information to the sub-
jects, but at different stages of the experiment. The effect of such difference has not 
yet been studied, to our knowledge. However, Espín et  al. (2017) find that when 
the future is perceived as predictable people tend to cooperate more; this may sug-
gest that cooperation is stronger when more information is disclosed. The potential 
1 See below for references.
2 We will review these studies below.
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relevance of this paper in the field of law and economics follows from the fact that 
the experiment inquires how regulation (which establishes and enforces competition 
and transparency) affects cooperation.3
In the following section, the related literature is reviewed; the experimental 
design, hypotheses and procedure are described in Sect.  3, and we introduce the 
experimental methodology in Sect. 4; in Sects. 5 and 6 the descriptive and econo-
metric results are given, and Sect. 7 concludes.
2  Related literature
The idea that economic institutions may have an influence on individual agents’ 
preferences is well grounded in the literature (Bowles 1998, 2011; Carpenter 2005). 
In this view, preferences have broadly to be intended as ‘attributes’ of individuals, 
which contribute to account for their actions, and so their definition includes values 
or what has been defined by Harsanyi (1982) ‘moral preferences’.
Market is one of the many economic institutions. An effect that markets and other 
economic institutions have on preferences is on the evolution of norms through the 
influence they have on the structure of social interaction.4 What is relevant for our 
discussion is that subset of norms which Bowles (1998) calls ‘nice traits’, that is, 
that kind of behaviours that in social interaction ‘confer benefits to others’ (page 92) 
like, for instance, contributing in a public goods game or cooperating in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game.
The literature offers two opposite views concerning how markets influence the 
way in which individuals behave towards each other in social interactions (for a clas-
sic discussion see Hirschman 1982). According to one theory, the doux-commerce 
thesis of Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Thomas Paine and Condorcet, a complex sys-
tem of interactions through market relies—in order to develop and flourish—on 
moral and social values, such as trust and propensity to cooperate (Falk and Szech 
2013).5 In this view, ‘commerce’ is seen as a powerful moralizing agent that pro-
duces a positive externality, that is, compatible psychological attitudes and moral 
dispositions. The second theory—the self-destruction thesis which dates back to 
Marx and finds in Hirsch (1976) a more recent influential discussion—is that the 
market undermines and erodes those same moral values that are its foundations 
and are necessary for its functioning. The discussion of the mechanisms through 
which the market as an economic institution has the effect of ‘crowding out virtues’ 
(Bowles 2011) is very relevant for this work.
First of all, the impersonality and anonymity together with the transitory nature of 
market interactions reduce the opportunity to sanction violation of norms and, there-
fore, to reward ‘nice traits’; besides, they increase the cost of acquiring information 
4 For a complete discussion of the several effects, that market and other economic institutions have on 
preferences see Bowles (1998).
5 A similar view is found in Sugden (2018).
3 The law and economics approach, indeed, consists in analyzing how legal rules affect economic vari-
ables (Marciano and Ramello 2019).
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about others’ behaviour and thus decrease the incentive of acquiring a reputation.6 
In addition, the erosion of socially beneficial behaviour may occur when a choice 
situation is framed as a competitive market, with many anonymous agents. Accord-
ing to this view, the focus on the competitive aspect of interaction and on the pursuit 
of self-interest as an ethically permissible rewarding strategy, together with the ano-
nymity of trade, displaces other-regarding behaviour and ethical values.7
The issue of how economic institutions—like markets—affect social preferences 
has been discussed widely both in theoretical and empirical studies.8 As mentioned 
above, few contributions have used controlled experiments in order to study the rela-
tion between market interaction and moral values, and in particular, the effect of 
competition on the propensity to cooperate. Falk and Szech (2013) present experi-
mental evidence on how interaction in a bilateral and multilateral double auction 
trading markets affects moral values, in particular the willingness to accept negative 
consequences for a third party with respect to individual decision making. Accord-
ing to their hypothesis, the interaction in markets would lead to an erosion of moral 
standards due to three essential characteristics of market: sharing and thus dilut-
ing the responsibility of negative consequences; observing others violating moral 
norms thus making self-interest ethically permissible; and framing choices by focus-
ing attention on aspects like trade and competition, instead of the moral aspects of 
choice. The results of the experiment confirm what was expected. The authors find 
that in both market settings the willingness to kill a mouse in exchange for money 
(negative consequence for a third party) is significantly higher than in an individual 
decision setting, and in the multilateral market the exchange is accepted for an even 
lower amount of money.
Brandts et  al. (2009) study the effects of competitive rivalry on the disposition 
towards others in a social dilemma game without complete contracts. They find that 
rivalry increases neither efficiency nor the income of those on the short side of the 
exchange relation; in addition, it has a negative effect on the subjective well-being of 
those on the long side, and a positive one on those on the short side, therefore gener-
ating inequalities. More importantly, in analysing the consequences that rivalry may 
have on well-being, they conclude that interacting under rivalry impacts negatively 
on people’s behavioural disposition towards others, mostly towards those encountered 
in the interaction, who they can meet again in the future. The “subsequent willing-
ness to help” decreases and may lead to the “obstruction of future cooperation” and 
“a deterioration of the social relations between interaction partners”. Significantly, 
they note that these effects cannot be explained only by differences in earnings due to 
interaction, but “are strongly related to experienced emotions” (page 1166).
Carpenter (2005) conducts an experiment to measure the effects of economic 
institutions on people’s social preferences, with the intent to assess whether and how 
6 For other important mechanisms like the erosion of segmentation and group selection see Bowles 
(1998) and references therein.
7 The framing or ‘construal’ effect of markets and related experimental evidence are discussed in Bowles 
(1998, 2011).
8 A list of references on the empirical studies concerning the effects of economic institutions and mar-
kets on values is in Bowles (1998, 2011), Falk and Szech (2013). Relevant cross-cultural studies on the 
topic are Heinrich et al. (2001, 2010), Hermann et al. (2008), Roth et al (1991).
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some features traditionally associated with markets, in particular anonymity and 
competition, affect individuals’ preferences for other people’s well-being. Results 
show that reducing anonymity makes people “more social”, as it reduces peo-
ple’s ability to engage in opportunistic acts. More importantly, market competition 
“erodes social preferences”, not only because it encourages opportunistic behaviour, 
thus “creating a less friendly atmosphere”, but also because the market institution 
itself—through a sort of framing effect—“decreases the other-regardingness” of the 
participants (page 3). A negative effect of competition on the propensity to cooper-
ate has also been found by Canegallo et al. (2008), who study subjects’ contribution 
to a public good in three different economic environments characterized by different 
degrees of competition.
Similar experimental findings are discussed in Hoffman et al. (1994), who exam-
ine the effect of the framing of interactions on ultimatum bargaining outcomes, and 
find that when they are framed as market interactions the distribution of the surplus 
is significantly affected (sellers offer much less of the surplus to buyers). Markets 
appear to stimulate more egoistic behaviour, with a deterioration of social prefer-
ences. Schotter et al. (1996) show that the introduction of competition reduces offers 
in the ultimatum game, suggesting that competition makes participants more selfish.
Transparency may play a role in this framework. On the one hand, as the intro-
duction points out, it is an essential ingredient of market efficiency and, as such, 
is generally promoted by economic theory. On the other hand, human actions and 
interactions are based on trust and on the counterparts’ behaviour (Camerer 2003). 
A consequence of this is that the more information agents have about their coun-
terparts, the more accurate their responses are. Information is important both for 
knowing better the environment in which one is operating in order to make accu-
rate decisions, and for trusting (or not) the other agents. As Rietz et al. (2013) show 
experimentally transparency—implemented in terms of information that each player 
has about the others’ actions—affects social welfare through enhancing individual 
trust. In particular, the more information a player has about the others’ decisions, 
the more she trusts the others. Correctly placed trust also increases the efficiency of 
markets. Transparency not only concerns information about the others’ actions, but 
also about the processes of decision.
A few experiments in economics have inquired the relationship between transpar-
ency, individual choices and consequent outcomes. Greiner et al. (2011) conduct an 
experiment on wage differentials, showing that when the determination of wages is 
transparently disclosed to the subjects, their performance responds to the economic 
incentive represented by wage differentials, while, when their mechanism is not dis-
closed to the subjects, effort and performances do not depend on such differentials, 
even if their existence is known to the subjects. In other words, transparency about 
the mechanism of wage formation affects individuals’ choices. Işgın and Sopher 
(2015) conduct an experiment, which shows that information transparency enhances 
efficiency (i.e. workers’ effort for a given wage) and welfare in the labour market. In 
their experiment transparency is implemented as follows: firms offer jobs and wages 
commensurate to the productivity level of each job. When submitting information 
about job vacancies, transparent firms disclose both the wage and the productiv-
ity level associated to the jobs; opaque firms announce wages but keep information 
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about productivity private. The experimental results show that workers spend more 
effort in the assigned tasks in the full information treatment than in the other. The 
authors interpret such a result as a consequence of perceived fairness: in case work-
ers perceive that they are treated fairly, they are more willing to spend effort. Fiala 
and Suetens (2017) conduct a meta-analysis on a series of experiments on voluntary 
contributions and decisions in oligopolistic settings. They focus on the role of trans-
parency, finding that when public goods games are analysed, disclosing informa-
tion about the earnings of the components of each group of players decreases the 
average contribution of the (other) members of the group, while displaying informa-
tion about individual choices made by other players in the group tends to lead to an 
increase in contributions.9
In sum, part of the experimental results reviewed above suggests that the more 
the experimental situation is framed as a competitive market (with complete con-
tracts) with many anonymous players, the less cooperative and less other-regarding 
the behaviour observed will be. Besides, other results show the relevance of trans-
parency in enhancing trust, promoting efficiency and, partly, inducing cooperative 
behaviour. Our experimental design aims at offering an experimental contribution to 
these two branches of literature.
As outlined in the introduction, the main research question of the paper concerns 
the possible effect that transparency, which we interpret as disclosure of information 
about the implementation of contractual clauses in a competitive setting, may have 
on social interaction.
First, we ask whether competition in the performance of a task has any effect on the 
willingness to contribute any positive amount to the voluntary provision of a public 
good. The question whether markets erode moral values is one of the most controver-
sial issue in the literature, and we have reviewed part of the debate above. In the paper 
we concentrate on one feature of market interaction—competition—and its effect on 
one aspect of others’ regarding behaviour—the propensity to cooperate as voluntary 
contribution to the provision of a public good. Our first hypothesis is that exposure to 
competition may reduce people’s propensity to contribute. The possible mechanisms 
with which this may occur emerge from the above discussion of the contributions to the 
literature—framing, anonymity, impersonality, transitory nature of market interaction.
Second, we inquire whether different levels of information concerning the results 
of the task performed in a competitive environment affects contributions to the pub-
lic good. These results concern the subject’s remuneration from the task and her 
ranking in its performance. The knowledge concerning these two aspects of the 
competitive performance represents the way in which we implement in the experi-
ment transparency in contract implementation. Our second hypothesis is that trans-
parency in the implementation of contracts enhances cooperation. As discussed 
above, several contributions in the literature show the relevance of disclosure of rel-
evant information in promoting decision accuracy and efficiency—for instance as a 
consequence of perceived fairness; enhancing trust and therefore social welfare; and 
promoting collusive and cooperative behaviour.
9 Consistently with this result, in oligopoly experiments information about payoffs significantly reduces 
the degree of collusion, while information on the individual choices of other group members increases it.
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As will emerge from the discussion of the experiment treatments, we decided to 
disclose the information concerning remuneration and ranking in the competitive 
performance at different stages of the experiment. Relying on some experimental 
results, like for instance Espín et  al. (2017) quoted above, our hypothesis is that 
cooperation will be stronger (the contribution to the public good higher) the higher 
the level of the information disclosed.
3  Experimental design and procedure
We designed an experiment with two steps and four treatments, and we implemented 
a repeated public goods game (PGG) with re-matching, so that each subject always 
played each round against subjects who were all different from those of the other 
rounds. A total of 160 subjects participated in the experiment, 40 for each treat-
ment. All of them were students of the School of Economics of the University of 
Torino (Italy). We recruited them by advertising for the experiment on the web-
page of the School, and they enrolled following an online procedure. No show up 
fee was given. Each experimental session involved 20 participants. Full anonymity 
was granted during and after the experiment. The PGG, which will be described 
in detail below, allows capturing the subject’s propensity to cooperate, when facing 
the choice between free-riding and contributing to the provision of a public good. 
Of course, this last decision entails the risk of being the sole contributor, while the 
other members of the group decide to free-ride. This situation would end in a net 
loss for the only contributor, whereas the case in which all the members of the group 
contribute their entire endowments maximises the social payoff.
3.1  Effort task
The experiment was made of two parts. In the first the participants were asked to 
perform an administrative-type task consisting in recopying in a form on the screen 
of their PC the enrolment numbers, the names and the scores of fictitious students; 
the names and the other data were created by choosing at random a string of let-
ters and figures. A quadruplet made of enrolment number, surname, name and mark 
entered correctly in the form made a completed unit of the task. In the case of mis-
takes, the program alerted the participant and did not allow him or her to continue 
before the mistake had been corrected.
The first difference between the treatments concerns the remuneration of this part 
of the experiment. We implemented two schemes, a non-competitive and a com-
petitive one; the first provides the baseline for assessing the effect of competition. 
In the non-competitive scheme the subjects received a remuneration of 8.5€ if they 
copied correctly 40 quadruplets in 30  min and 4€ if they did not finish the task. 
The program announced the end of this part of the experiment either when the 40th 
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quadruplets had been entered, or after 30 min.10 Instead, in the competitive scheme 
the number of lines to be copied was not limited, and at the end of the task, i.e. after 
30 min, the subjects were ranked according to their performance, and the payments 
were differentiated. The players falling in the best group of 5 obtained 15€, those 
in the second best group 10€, those in the third 6€ and those in the last 3€. The 
payment in the baseline treatment (i.e. 8.5€) corresponds to the expected payment 
under the competitive treatment. The players copied on average 80.08 quadruplets 
under the competitive scheme, i.e. twice the goal assigned in the non-competitive 
framework. This proves that the requirement under the non-competitive treatment 
was easy to accomplish and arguably did not entail competition among the subjects. 
Before starting the session, the experimenters informed the subjects about the rules. 
In particular the subjects in the competitive environment knew that they would be 
divided in four groups according to their performance and that the payments were 
to be scaled across the groups, with the highest for the best performing group. In 
contrast, the information about the exact amounts paid to each group and about the 
actual ranking was provided in different ways across three different treatments, as 
will be described in detail in the following section.
3.2  Public goods game
After performing the described task, the subjects played five rounds of a classical 
PGG in groups of four anonymous individuals. In order to maximise the number 
of observations, we re-matched the players after each round, following two rules. 
The first was random matching (see Andreoni 1988; Botelho et  al. 2009), which 
means that at each round the players were matched with three others who were not 
members of the same group in the previous or subsequent rounds.11 In other words, 
each player faced three new opponents in each round. The second rule, relevant for 
competitive treatments, further constrained this re-matching procedure to form the 
groups so as to always include one player from each of the quartiles in which the 
players were ranked after the initial task. This procedure was envisaged to avoid any 
possible effect due to the average amount gained in the first part of the experiment. 
For instance, contributions may increase with initial income. If three subjects with 
low initial income and a subject with high initial income compose a group, the lat-
ter will possibly contribute more than the former ones in the first round. At the end 
of the round, when the high-income individual looks at the sum of all the contribu-
tions, she could get disappointed by the fact that the other three members contrib-
uted less than she did, and this could affect her subsequent behaviour (see Cherry 
et  al. 2005; Buckley and Croson 2006). The composition of the groups described 
above excludes this effect. Of course, also the opposite may be true: people with 
higher initial income may contribute less. In order to avoid any effect of this type, 
the groups were composed in the way described. However, given the capacity of the 
lab (20 seats), this procedure allowed for a maximum of five rounds of the PGG.
10 It never occurred that a subject did not complete the task in the 30 min allocated.
11 Of course, all players were informed about this.
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The players who performed the task in the competitive environment played the 
PGG under three different treatments, representing three different levels of transpar-
ency. Indeed, the difference concerned the information about their position in the 
ranking and the income they received in the first part. In the first treatment neither 
the position in the ranking nor the remuneration from the first part was disclosed 
before the PGG; this information was given them only at the very end of the experi-
ment, i.e. after playing the PGG. The second treatment entailed the disclosure of 
the information about the income obtained in the first part, but not of the ranking, 
before playing the PGG; the subjects knew their position in the ranking after the 
PGG. In the third treatment the complete information about placement and income 
from the first part was disclosed before the PGG. To sum up, the participants played 
the PGG either (1) knowing neither their ranking nor their income, (2) knowing only 
the income, but not the ranking, and (3) knowing both. The difference between these 
three treatments aims at disentangling the effects of competition. The comparison 
of the blind treatment with the baseline treatment (where there was no competition) 
isolates the effect of working under competitive pressure, separate from the effect 
of income or pride (or frustration) arising from knowing one’s position in the rank. 
The comparison between the blind treatment and that with partial information aims 
at identifying the effect of the initial endowment on the contributions to the PGG. 
Finally, the treatment with full information isolates the effect of knowing the posi-
tion in the ranking due to the comparison between this treatment and the others. 
Informing somebody about a good result in a game may contribute to stimulate her 
happiness, inducing the “winners” of this first part of the game to contribute more 
(Drouvelis and Grosskopf 2016 and Layous et al. 2017). A summary of the charac-
teristics of the design is given in the following Table 1.
At the beginning of each of the five rounds of the PGG the participants received 
a fresh endowment of 60 experimental coins, each worth 0.01€. The subjects then 
had to decide whether to keep them for themselves or to allocate all or part of them 
to a common fund, knowing that the total amount contributed would be doubled and 
then redistributed in equal shares among the members of the group at the end of 
each round. The coins kept by the subject remained as her earning.12 The subjects 
also knew that they would have always been matched with strangers at the beginning 
of each round. Between one round and the following the subjects viewed the total 
amount contributed and their gain in that round. At the end of the PGG the total pay-
off (the sum of what was earned in each of the five rounds of the PGG plus the gain 
of the first part of the experiment) was displayed. As we know, in this kind of PGG 
the unique Nash equilibrium predicts always to contribute nothing to the common 
fund (complete free-riding), while the Pareto-efficient solution (full cooperation) 
predicts allocation to the fund of the whole endowment.
12 Letting E be the initial endowment, S the sum of the contributions of the four subjects, and  ci 
the experimental coins allocated by individual i to the fund, in each round i’s payoff P was then 
 Pi = E − ci + (2/4)S = E − ci + ½ S.
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3.3  Experimental procedure: practical details
At the beginning of each session, the subjects were asked to sit at 20 different iso-
lated computer terminals, so that no communication was possible. The instructions 
appeared sequentially on each participant’s computer screen and would proceed to 
the following page only when all the participants had clicked on the ‘Continue’ but-
ton on the screen, while they were read aloud by an experimenter at the same pace.13 
When the instructions on the first part of the experiment were over, the time for the 
completion of the task started running. The list with the data to be copied as well as 
the rows with the empty fields appeared sequentially on each participant’s screen. 
In the treatments with competition the countdown in seconds of the time remaining 
was displayed on the top right hand-side of the screen. When the time was over the 
information about the ranking and/or income was given according to the treatment. 
Then, the second part of the experiment started. The PGG was illustrated to the sub-
jects, both on the screen and by the same experimenter. It was made clear that: the 
game would be played in groups of 4 participants unknown to each other and that 
the composition of the group would change at each round, with no re-encounters; 
that all the initial sum would be kept as earnings in case no coin was allocated to the 
common fund; that in each round the earnings in case all participants allocated all 
the sum to the fund would be twice the initial endowment; and that no amount could 
be transferred from one round to the following one.
After the description a written summary of the instructions was distributed to the 
participants and this part of the experiment started. In each repetition the subjects 
faced a screen with an empty box where they had to enter the amount of coins they 
wanted to allocate to the common fund. After each subject had taken the decision 
or the time allocated had passed,14 a new screen for a new round appeared. In every 
repetition, each subject could see summarized in a table the total amount of the 
common fund, her earnings for that round, the amount of coins kept by her, and the 
division of the common fund and her total profit up to that round. At the end of the 
5 rounds, the total earnings from the experiment (first and second part) appeared on 
the screen. Once the experiment was over, the subjects were asked to fill in a ques-
tionnaire, which appeared on the screen, and then they were asked to leave the room 
and come back individually to fill in their receipts and be paid in order to preserve 
full anonymity among participants.
4  Experimental strategy and empirical methodology
Two figures were of interest: the contribution to the PGG and the share of extreme 
behaviours, that is full free riding (i.e. contributing 0 to the PGG) and full coop-
eration (i.e. contributing the entire endowment of 60 experimental coins). At each 
13 The experimenter was the same for all sessions.
14 Fixing a maximum time for the decision is common practice, for the experiment not to be blocked. 
In such a case, the programme set the contribution equal to 0, and the game proceeded to the next 
round. The individual received nothing for that round (the endowment was destroyed). This event never 
occurred.
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round, the contribution to the PGG is bounded between 0 and 60. We therefore treat 
this variable as a truncated continuous variable, and analyse the effects of the treat-
ments on it with panel tobit regressions, following Moffatt (2016).15 A model with 
random mixed effects could have been suitable too, however, the panel tobit model 
was chosen for two reasons: (1) the choice of how much to contribute is exogenously 
limited; the subjects may want to contribute more than their endowment, or they 
may desire to subtract some from the common fund, but they are not allowed to. 
Consequently, their decisions are “truncated” by the rules of the game; (2) a large 
mass of probability could accumulate on the two extreme values (0 and 60). In such 
a case, OLS estimation may produce biased and inconsistent results (Moffatt 2016), 
while tobit procedures are suitable to correct these overloads, which render the 
underlying distribution of the dependent variable non-Gaussian. We specify three 
different models to check whether the effects of the treatments are robust to differ-
ent specifications. In particular, in the first we include: the dummies for the different 
treatments, the time spent by the subject to decide how much to contribute, the time 
spent in looking at the results of the previous round, a variable that captures the 
round, and two one-period-lagged dummies for the extreme behaviours (free riding 
and full contribution). In the second specification we replace these extreme choices 
with the value of the fund (i.e. the sum of all the four contributions) and the average 
contributions of the other three members of the group.16 Both these last controls are 
presented lagged by one and two rounds to capture their persistence on the indi-
vidual choices.17 With respect to the first specification the third model removes the 
extreme choices (and the time-to-see-results variable) and introduces a variable that 
captures the difference between the player’s contribution in round t and the average 
contribution to the fund, without much difference in results. This variable captures 
whether the subject is more or less cooperative than the mean of the other members 
of the group.
Table 1  Summary of the characteristics of each treatment
Competition Information on pay-
ment first part
Information on 
position in the 
rank
Baseline treatement (BL) No No No
Full ignorance treatment (IG) Yes No No
Partial information treatment (PI) Yes Yes No
Full information treatment (FI) Yes Yes Yes
15 In particular, Moffatt (2016, pp. 193–197) applies tobit regression to data from a public goods experi-
ment.







 where c−i,j,t is the average contribution to the PGG 
of the subjects other than subject “i” who belong to group j at time t; Fj,t is the amount of the fund of 
group j at time t, and ci,j,t is the contribution of subject i who belongs to group j at time t.
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The extreme choices are instead modelled separately: we constructed dummy var-
iables for free-riding or contributing the full endowment at each round. In this case 
we analyse the data using probit regressions.
Whereas we designed the experiment in order to render the observations inde-
pendent of each other at every round, gains and the others’ contributions in a round 
may affect a subject’s choice in the subsequent ones. Therefore, we ran panel regres-
sions and, for each individual, we controlled for both the lagged value of her con-
tribution to the PGG and of the average contributions of the other three members 
of the group. In this way we capture the “learning” effect, i.e. the effect that play-
ing in a group of co-operators (non-co-operators) in round t  −  1 (and t  −  2 in a 
second estimated model) may have on one’s decisions in round t. We capture the 
well-known decreasing trend of contributions to the PGG (see for instance Camerer 
2003; Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011) controlling for the round. Moreover, we con-
trol for the time spent in choosing the contribution and for the time spent in looking 
at the results in the previous round. Under the assumption that these times proxy 
for the subject’s degree of instinctiveness used in the decision process (Rubinstein 
2007, 2013; Piovesan and Wengström 2009 and Lotito et al. 2013), this will there-
fore clean the results from the “instinctiveness” component. We also control for 
the participant’s gender (1 if male, 0 if female), and—in one of the three estimated 
models—for a couple of dummies that capture whether the subject had fully coop-
erated (i.e. contributed 60 experimental coins) or free-rode in the previous round. 
This helps to clean the results from the possibility that someone had a pre-conceived 
strategy of pure contribution or pure free-riding. We control also for the voluntary 
social activities conducted by the subjects (as detected from the questionnaire), in 
order to capture the possible effect of pro-social attitudes. In the econometric analy-
sis presented below we do not control for the income gained in the first part of the 
experiment, as we have introduced it in several estimations, but it had never shown 
any statistically significant effect.18
The described empirical analysis allows to control for path dependency, but, 
unfortunately, does not for individual fixed effects. Indeed, as each participant is 
subjected to only one treatment, running panel regressions with fixed effects would 
not allow to identify the effect of the different treatments. A possible—though par-
tial—solution to this problem is to consider the average contribution of each partici-
pant over the five rounds, collapsing the five time-variant observations into a single 
observation. Regressions based on this strategy are presented in the Appendix.
We performed also an analysis of the response times to understand the degree of 
instinctiveness behind the subjects’ decisions (Rubinstein 2007, 2013), in order to 
assess whether the presence of competition and the information about one’s position 
in the competitive ranking render the decision more or less instinctive.
18 Income is not statistically significant even in the treatment where only the wage gained in the first part 
of the experiment is disclosed before the PGG.
280 European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 50:267–294
1 3
5  Results: descriptive and graphical analysis
The performances in the three treatments with competition in the first part of the 
experiment are not statistically different (see Table 2), which suggests that the sub-
jects involved in these treatments had statistically the same ability, and therefore the 
differences on the other outcomes cannot be attributed to heterogeneity in abilities. 
Male subjects recopied correctly more quadruplets that their female peers, which 
might reflect the fact that competition has different effects on the two genders, with 
males more responsive than females to competition (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; 
Migheli 2015). This gender effect might affect the results as follows: if males are 
more competitive and they work harder than females, then we will end with more 
males than females receiving a high income from performing the task. Indeed, there 
is an average difference of 0.89€ in the sub-sample of subjects who recopied the 
quadruplets in a competitive setting. This difference is statistically significant (at 1% 
level) but is small both in value and in relative terms (it amounts to 10.5% of the 
average income from the first part). Finally, we note that the time employed by the 
subjects to choose how much to contribute to the PGG is decreasing with the level 
of information disclosed before the PGG. We will return on this result later.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the subsequent 
analyses. We may observe a certain variability between the contributions in the dif-
ferent treatments. Most noticeably, full information about both the ranking and the 
income from the first part enhances considerably the contributions to the PGG with 
respect to all other cases.
Figure 1 presents the average contributions per treatment and by round for the 
full game. Here too we can observe some interesting outcomes. First, while for the 
treatment with full information we observe almost no decline in the average con-
tribution to the PGG, in the other treatments we observe a decline. Subjects who 
played with no or partial information reduce their average contributions more than 
the subjects in the baseline treatment. These outcomes suggest that competition per 
se has a negative effect on cooperation. In addition, the lines in the graph suggest 
that disclosing information plays a key role in sustaining cooperation. Indeed, all the 
subjects start from average levels of contribution that are similar and statistically not 
different from each other. However, as the subjects interact, cooperation decreases, 
as it happens in the baseline treatment (consistently with what usually found in the 
literature). In other words, competition seems to have a negative effect on the con-
servation of cooperation, rather than on cooperation itself. Instead, transparency 
about remuneration sustains cooperation, and generates increasing and statistically 
significant differences between average contributions under full information and 
under other conditions. In addition, statistical tests on these differences reveal that 
in the full-information setting the average contributions are not statistically different 
over the five rounds.
The comparison between the contribution in the first round and those in the 
other rounds is informative about how long cooperation lasts in time. Indeed, in 
the first round players have no information about the average level of coopera-
tion of their game mates; this is no longer true from the second round on, when 
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players choose after observing the average contribution of the other players who 
are in the same group. In other words, the contribution in the first round repre-
sents the unconditional level of cooperation of the player, while in the subsequent 
rounds we observe individual cooperation conditioned to what happened in the 
past. For this reason, to analyse how long cooperation lasts, it is common in the 
literature (Andreoni 1988; Cadsby and Maynes 1998; Milinski et al. 2002; Croson 
et al. 2005) to compare the average contributions in the rounds from the second 
to the last with the average contribution in the first round. In particular, we aim 
at capturing the first round in which the average contributed sum is statistically 
different from that in round 1. The first round in which the average contribution is 
statistically different from the average contribution in round 1 captures the round 
from which we can assess, with statistical support, that contributions have started 
to decrease. Figure  1, indeed, shows that the average contributions decrease 
monotonically in all the treatments, except that with full information. Using this 
strategy, we observe that in all the treatments, but that with full information, the 
decrease between the first and the fifth round is always statistically significant at 
5% or even at 1%. In the baseline treatment the decrease of the contribution with 
respect to the first round is statistically significant from the fourth round (38.95 
coins in the first against 29.62 in the fourth—p value = 0.034—and 29.30 in the 
fifth—p-value19 = 0.029). In the competitive treatment with no information about 
the ranking or about the income, the decrease with respect to the first round is 
statistically significant from the third round (39.57 coins in the first, against 31.02 
in the third—p-value = 0.041—27.05 in the fourth—p-value = 0.001—and 19.30 
in the fifth—p-value < 0.001). In the setting with partial information, the decrease 
with respect to the first round also becomes statistically significant since the third 
round (from 35.35 coins in the first to 26.95 coins in the third—p-value = 0.057—
to 19.32 in the fourth—p-value = 0.0001—to 20.20 in the fifth—p-value = 0.002). 
All this is important. It suggests that competition disrupts cooperation when there 
Table 2  Recopied quadruplets 
and treatments
OLS estimates (s.e. in brackets)
Male 4.669
(1.560)***
Competition with partial information (wage only) 0.643
(1.187)







19 Here and below the p value refers to the statistical significance of the difference between the average 
contribution in round t (for t = 3, 4, 5) and the average contribution in round 1.
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics: 
average values and their 
standard deviations (in brackets)
a Calculated on the total number of observations (number of subjects 
× rounds)





Competition with full ignorance 30.31
(22.76)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 26.41
(23.08)
Competition with full information 41.70
(22.31)
Performance in the task (average number of quadruplets 





Competition with full ignorance 80.22
(19.26)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 81.12
(16.38)
Competition with full information 78.89
(20.69)
Individual characteristics









Competition with full ignorance 33.00
(29.32)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 24.98
(22.93)
Competition with full information 23.49
(25.42)
Percentage of free-riding  episodesa 16.75
(37.37)
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is full or partial ignorance, while it enhances both the level of the contribution 
and the maintenance of a high level over time (rounds) when there is full knowl-
edge. Also, the data show that partial ignorance (i.e. when only the information 
on the income earned is disclosed) hinders cooperation more than full ignorance. 
The relevance of knowledge was unexpected; data do not provide an indication 
about its cause. We will suggest a few possible explanations in the last section.
Figure 2 presents the cumulative distributions of the contributions in the four 
treatments. We can observe that in the baseline and in the treatments with no or 
only partial information the density of free-riders and of subjects with low contri-
butions is much larger than in the treatment with full information. In addition, the 
share of contributions equal to the whole endowment (60 experimental coins) is 
much higher in this last treatment than in all the others. This result is also unex-
pected and relevant; we will return to it.
Table 4 completes the picture reporting the percentage of times in which a subject 
made an extreme choice (either free-riding or contributing the entire initial endow-
ment). The statistical significance of the differences is tested through a Mann–Whit-
ney test. These percentages are calculated on the total number of choices made (this 
Fig. 1  Contribution to the PGG by treatment and round
Fig. 2  Cumulative distributions of contributions to the PGG by treatment
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renders the number of observations equal to 800: 160 subjects times 5 rounds). The 
subjects free-rode much less and contributed the full amount much more frequently 
in the treatment with full information than in the other treatments. In particular, 
the effect is much stronger for the cases in which the subjects contributed the full 
amount. Indeed, the share of free-riding decisions is similar in the baseline treat-
ment and in the full-information one, with no significant difference, while the differ-
ence is very strong in the case of full cooperation. Apparently, the effect of knowing 
one’s own position in the ranking is more effective in enhancing cooperation than in 
discouraging free-riding.
The bottom of the Table shows pairwise comparison for average contributions to 
the public good, by treatment. Given the presence of multiple choices, the standard 
deviations may be corrected using the Bonferroni or the Scheffe methods; we have 
chosen this last, as it is one of the most general available. The table reports the levels 
of statistical significance based on it. The picture is very similar to what emerges 
from the central panel of the table: in the full-information treatment the average con-
tribution is much higher than in the other treatments, and the differences are always 
statistically highly significant. The lowest average contribution (26.41 experimental 
coins) corresponds to the treatment with partial information: this figure is statisti-
cally different from those of the baseline and the full-information treatments. The 
average contribution in the treatment with ignorance is not statistically different 
from that in the baseline treatment. Information has a role to play: when full infor-
mation about both the remuneration of the work and the subject’s relative position in 
Table 4  Pair-wise comparisons of extreme behaviours and of average contributions by treatment (stand-
ard errors in brackets)
% of free-riding episodes Observations
BL IG PI FI
Baseline 16.00
(36.75)
Competition with ignorance 17.00
(36.66)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 22.00
(41.53)
Competition with full information 12.00
(32.58)
BL IG PI FI
Baseline 29.50
(3.23)
Competition with ignorance 24.50
(3.05)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 20.50
(2.86)
Competition with full information 49.00
(3.54)
Average contribution Observations
BL IG PI FI
Baseline 33.31
(1.596)
Competition with ignorance 30.31
(1.610)
Competition with partial information (wage only) 26.41
(1.632)
Competition with full information 41.70
(1.579)
1 Mann-Whitney tests
Legenda: BL = baseline; IG = with ignorance; PI = with partial information (wage only); FI = with full information 
Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%; - not significant at conventional levels
200
Significance with respect to treatment1
- * -
* * *** 200








*** *** *** 200
-
200
- - *** 200
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the rank is disclosed, the average contribution is maximised. When information only 
about the remuneration of the first part of the experiment is disclosed, the average 
contribution is minimised. This non-monotonic path followed by the average con-
tributions suggests that the effect of information on cooperation depends on which 
piece of information is released.
In sum, the results of the experiment show that transparency has no effect on the 
contributions to the PGG in the first round, i.e. no treatment disrupts cooperation at 
the beginning. However, transparency supports cooperation over the rounds of the 
game, while in the other treatment conditions, cooperation declines over time, as 
usually observed in repeated PGGs. While such a result does not allow for conclud-
ing that market competition may hinder cooperation, as hypothesised at the begin-
ning of the paper, we can nevertheless observe that transparency preserves coopera-
tion, even in competitive environments.
6  Results: econometric analysis
Table 5 reports the coefficients of panel tobit regressions for three different specifi-
cations.20 The results confirm what has already been suggested by the previous anal-
ysis. The baseline treatment is taken as reference; this implies that the coefficients 
for the three treatments introduced in the regressions are to be interpreted as effects 
relative to the baseline. The contributions under full information are always signif-
icantly larger than those in the baseline, and people contributed significantly less 
in the partial-information treatment than in the baseline. Moreover, a simple t-test 
highlights that the coefficients for the full-information treatment are statistically dif-
ferent from the coefficient for the partial-information treatment. This also confirms 
the previous results. People playing the PGG under the no-information treatment 
contribute less than people playing the baseline, but the difference is not statistically 
significant.
The figures in the table also suggest other interesting results. First, in spite of the 
matching procedure that always generates groups of strangers (i.e. of people who 
had never played in the same group in any of the previous rounds), the contributions 
are strongly path-dependent. The coefficients for the lagged values of the contribu-
tion (i.e. the sum contributed by individual i in the previous round) and the coeffi-
cients for the lagged values of the others’ average contribution are statistically very 
significant. In particular, the value of the contribution at times t − 2 (L2) and t − 1 
(L1) is linked to the individual contribution at time t positively, while the average 
amount of the others’ contribution has the opposite (i.e. negative) effect. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the first and second lag coefficients is almost the same, suggesting 
that the subject discounts the past at a very low rate.
The inclusion of these variables in the regression decreases the coefficients for the 
partial and the full-information dummies and the associated levels of significance. 
20 Contributions were also analysed through panel regressions clustering the standard errors at session 
level. The statistical significance was never worse than that reported in the table.
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Arguably, this is a reflex of the persistence over time of the effect of the past expe-
rience on the present decision. This suggests that, though the observations in our 
sample are independent of each other because of the way in which the groups are 
formed at each round, the individuals anyway internalise the behaviour of the others 
Table 5  Panel Tobit analysis of the individual contributions (measured in experimental coins) to the pub-
lic good (standard errors in brackets)
Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Contribution Contribution Contribution
No information − 5.534 − 6.648 − 6.409
(5.599) (4.460) (7.687)
Partial information (wage only) − 11.12** − 7.689* − 14.58*
(5.633) (4.632) (7.698)
Full information 16.08*** 8.852* 21.85***
(5.901) (4.608) (7.967)
Round − 3.320*** − 0.958 − 5.824***
(1.262) (1.974) (1.040)








Time to choose 0.199*** 0.152** 0.200***
(0.0640) (0.0638) (0.066)
Time to see results (L1) − 0.186* − 0.329***
(0.110) (0.123)
Full cooperation (L1) 21.95***
(4.833)




Difference from the average contribution (L1) 0.044
(0.080)
Constant 37.29*** 8.182 63.76***
(9.524) (14.17) (7.407)
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.409 0.202
Wald Chi squared 94.44 208.32 60.45
Observations 640 480 640
Number of subjects 160 160 160
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in the previous rounds, and they discount these behaviours at a very low rate (the 
coefficients are very close to each other over time). Last but not least, the dummy 
that captures whether the distance from one’s contribution and the average contribu-
tion at t − 1 is positive has a positive coefficient. This suggests that people who tend 
to be more cooperative in a round remain more cooperative than the average in the 
subsequent rounds. Gender does not appear to be significantly related to the level of 
contributions.
Additionally, it can be noted that the amount of time people take to decide how 
much to contribute is positively and significantly related to the level of the contri-
bution, while the longer they take to see the results from the previous round, the 
less they contribute. It is noteworthy that specifications 1 and 2 produce effects 
whose size is very close (specification 2) or close (specification 1) to the effect sizes 
reported in Table 4. Therefore, we consider these two specifications to be the best of 
the table, and we rely particularly on them, rather than on specification 3.
Table 6 presents the results of the panel probit estimates for the extreme behav-
iours. These are defined as perfect free-riding (i.e. contributing 0 experimental 
coins in a round) and as complete cooperation (i.e. contributing 60 experimental 
coins, the whole endowment, in a round). The figures in the table confirm what 
the other analyses have already highlighted. The treatments have no effect on the 
probability of full free-riding: this behaviour is distributed more or less homoge-
neously across treatments, although when full information is provided the share 
of free riding occurrences (i.e. null contributions) in the total number of decisions 
is slightly lower than in the other cases (but this difference is not statistically 
significant). Only the average contribution of the other players in round t  −  1 
seems to slightly decrease the probability of free-riding in round t, but this result 
is not robust to different specifications (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table  6). 
The treatment variables are, in contrast, effective in promoting cooperation: in 
the setting with full information, the probability of contributing all the 60 experi-
mental coins in a round is between 73 and 83 percent higher than in the baseline 
treatment. This is an impressive figure; we will discuss it in the following section. 
There is also no significant difference between the baseline and the other two 
treatments that do not entail full information. Also, the individual contribution in 
round t − 1 increases the probability of contributing the full endowment in round 
t, while the opposite happens for the average contribution of the others. This is 
in line with the results presented in Table 5. Subjects display a path-dependent 
behaviour, in the sense that at each round they behave consistently with their past 
decisions, but apparently try to benefit from the others’ high contributions. This 
appears as a contradiction; but at the end of each round, the subjects see the total 
value of the fund, while they do not see the others’ average contribution nor the 
others’ individual contributions. Since we do not know whether they mentally 
calculate the others’ average contribution, we might suggest that they respond 
more to the total value of the fund than to the average contribution of the others. 
From a quantitative perspective, this distinction is not relevant, but from a psy-
chological point of view, it is. There may be two possible interpretations. First, 
there is some degree of constancy in the subject’s behaviour, so that people who 
start contributing large stakes continue doing so. Second, the individual really 
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responds to the total value of the fund by increasing one’s own level of coopera-
tion, but she does not disentangle her own from the others’ contributions and her 
behaviour is unconsciously driven by her past decisions.
Interestingly, the time spent by a subject in looking at the results increases 
the probability of free-riding (column 1), and decreases that of contributing the 
whole endowment (column 3). However, these results are not robust to different 
Table 6  Analysis of extreme contributions. Panel probit estimates (s.e. in brackets)
Standard errors in parentheses









Male 0.687** 0.742** 0.118 0.121
(0.295) (0.336) (0.225) (0.247)
With no information − 0.0837 − 0.0215 − 0.152 − 0.194
(0.407) (0.460) (0.323) (0.352)
With partial information (only about wage) 0.189 0.356 − 0.178 − 0.248
(0.392) (0.452) (0.323) (0.354)
With full information − 0.358 − 0.415 0.730** 0.827**
(0.416) (0.471) (0.329) (0.363)
Round 0.213** − 0.171**
(0.0976) (0.0795)
Contribution (L1) − 0.00780* − 0.00295 0.0243*** 0.0214***
(0.00437) (0.00518) (0.00468) (0.00514)
Average others’ contribution (L1) 0.0162 0.00471 − 0.0669*** − 0.0597***
(0.0144) (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0163)
Time to look at the results of the previous 0.0170** 0.00910 − 0.0142** − 0.0101
(0.00793) (0.00901) (0.00630) (0.00682)
Time to make the choice − 0.00493 − 0.00468 0.0184*** 0.0190***
(0.00443) (0.00464) (0.00431) (0.00459)
Income from the initial task 0.0142 0.00481
(0.0406) (0.0312)
Volunteer (yes = 1) − 0.581 0.291
(0.435) (0.307)
Constant − 2.498*** − 3.320*** − 0.701 − 0.304
(0.813) (0.951) (0.631) (0.720)
Pseudo R-squared 0.181 0.187 0.239 0.336
Log-likelihood ratio test 50.57 57.92 19.71 23.88
Wald Chi squared 24.91 24.97 77.42 71.87
Observations 640 640 640 640
Number of subjects 160 160 160 160
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specifications. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is not relevant in 
the case of free-riding but is positively correlated with the decision to cooperate 
fully.21
All the results reported in the previous tables include lagged variables, exclud-
ing the results of the first round of the experiment. As a robustness check, the same 
specifications as those presented in Table 5 are used for regressions that include also 
the results of the first round of the experiment; the estimates are reported in Table 7 
in Appendix. The figures confirm the findings reported in the other tables, which, 
therefore, are not biased by the exclusion of the results of the first round.
As mentioned at the end of Sect. 4, Table 8 in Appendix shows some additional 
robustness checks. The results are in line with the panel regressions, thus confirming 
them.
7  Conclusions
The results of the paper suggest that complete contracts not followed by transpar-
ent information about their implementation may be detrimental for individuals’ pro-
social behaviour. Our experiment aimed at assessing the effect of competition and 
transparency on cooperation. The first hypothesis was that exposure to competition 
reduces people’s propensity to cooperate, arguably due to the enhancement of a self-
ish mood stimulated by the competition. The second hypothesis was that transpar-
ency in the implementation of contracts enhances cooperation. We found mixed sup-
port for the first hypothesis, while the results support the second one. In absence of 
information about the results of the competition, the propensity to cooperate was 
unaffected (Table 5, line 1). Note that this result is not conclusive: it is possible that 
the competition was too feeble to actually induce a selfish mood, or that “they came 
to play” effect (see Carpenter et al. 2006) prevailed. All what we can infer is that the 
effect of competition, if existent, is too small to appear in the setting of our experi-
ment. Instead, we found that competition has a significant effect if the information 
that accompanies it is varied. Partial information reduces the propensity to cooperate 
(Table 5, line 2), but full information (or transparency) strongly enhances it (Table 5, 
line 3). In the light of the extant literature on transparency, our results provide some 
evidence about its effects on cooperation and suggest that disclosing information not 
only enhances the efficiency of markets, but also promotes pro-social behaviours. 
Consequently, legislators should keep spending effort in promoting and implement-
ing transparency. We may also provide some additional interpretations of the results 
obtained. The first has to do with the notion of overall security.22 A person feels 
21 Lotito et al. (2013, 2015) obtained, in a setting devoid of rivalry, that the decision time is inversely 
correlated with the degree of cooperation. The double evidence suggests that cooperation is spontaneous 
in non-competitive settings, while it requests some thinking when the possibility of strategic behavior by 
other subjects may be more relevant, thus displacing the instinctive behavior. However, data are (still) too 
limited to establish this conclusion.
22 Garrone and Ortona (2013) found that overall security, as self-assessed following the economics of 
happiness approach, strongly correlates with several relational and economic items. The definition 
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more secure the more she knows all the relevant features of the environment that 
surrounds her; and a secure person, arguably, is more prone to help. In our setting 
the full knowledge of one’s own position in the game produces a feeling of secu-
rity, while a partial knowledge adds an element of uncertainty to the environment, 
and hence reduces security; while a total absence of information de-emphasizes 
the security concern. However, the study of security as such is in its infancy (see 
Garrone and Ortona 2013 for a discussion of the meaning of the notion); hence, 
what has been stated above is highly speculative. The second possible interpretation 
relates to fairness: people, who are told that their remuneration is fair compared to 
that of their competitors, as it reflects their relative performance, are more willing 
to contribute to the common good. This is so because if the payment for a work is 
perceived as fair, negative sentiments such as envy and resentment are minimised. 
This could be an extension of the idea of conditional cooperation (see Fischbacher 
et al. 2001). Indeed, people evaluate fairness not only looking at the results of some 
behaviour, but also at the intentions behind that behaviour (Falk and Fischbacher 
2006). In this sense, the subjects who know both their position in the ranking and 
their payment may feel that their remunerations are intentionally fair, and therefore 
they show a high level of cooperation (conditional on how they have been previously 
treated). Note that the two explanations are not mutually exclusive, and that both 
require further evidence to be assessed.
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Appendix
See Tables 7 and 8.
Footnote 22 (continued)




European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 50:267–294 
Table 7  Panel tobit Estimates including the results of the first experimental round
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Contribution Contribution Contribution
No information − 6.542 − 7.188 − 6.261
(7.706) (7.844) (7.692)
Partial information (wage only) − 14.69 − 13.97 − 14.02
(7.691)* (7.828)* (7.696)*
Full information 19.50 20.58 20.24
(7.934)** (8.068)** (7.949)**
Round − 6.143 − 5.640 − 6.122
(0.786)*** (0.766)*** (0.786)***




Constant 42.31 55.50 45.43
(7.494)*** (6.052)*** (8.027)***
Observations 800 800 800
Number of subjects 160 160 160
Table 8  Tobit regressions on the average contributions to the PGG
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
No information − 3.461 − 4.179 − 3.348 − 3.079
(4.408) (4.489) (4.401) (3.333)
Partial information − 9.412 − 8.570 − 9.097 − 7.211
(4.409)** (4.484)* (4.419)** (3.345)**
Full information 10.83 11.95 11.17 7.500
(4.529)** (4.596)*** (4.543)** (3.441)**






Constant 17.04 34.28 18.85 18.08
(7.668)** (3.179)*** (8.010)** (6.070)***
Observations 160 160 160 160
LR Chi squared 27.37 21.43 27.95 116.78
Pseudo R-squared 0.0223 0.0175 0.0228 0.0952
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